All translations have been updated for the Debian Bookworm version of the Debian Administrator's Handbook. Due to Debian Trixie being released soon, we hope to release the Trixie version of the book soon as well. Thus, there might only be a brief period to translate the Bookworm version of the book this time. We thank everybody who has contributed so far and hope that you continue your great work.

Overview

Project website debian-handbook.info
Instructions for translators

https://debian-handbook.info/contribute/ Mailing list for translators: <debian-handbook-translators@lists.alioth.debian.org
Project maintainers User avatar rhertzogUser avatar pereUser avatar dleidert
Translation license GNU General Public License v2.0 or later
Translation process
  • Translations can be made directly.
  • Translation suggestions can be made.
  • Any authenticated user can contribute.
  • The translation uses bilingual files.
Source code repository https://salsa.debian.org/hertzog/debian-handbook.git
Repository branch bookworm/main
Last remote commit Update PO files c274c239
User avatar dleidert authored 2 days ago
Last commit in Weblate ru-RU: Translated using Weblate. 224cdc99
User avatar ashed authored 12 hours ago
Weblate repository https://hosted.weblate.org/git/debian-handbook/12_advanced-administration/
File mask */14_security.po
Translation file Download fr-FR/14_security.po
Last change April 22, 2025, 2:06 a.m.
Last change made by None
Language French
Language code fr
Text direction Left to right
Case sensitivity Case-sensitive
Number of speakers 332,956,350
Number of plurals 2
Plural type One/other
Plurals Singular 0, 1
Plural 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, …
Plural formula n > 1
yesterday

String statistics

Strings percent Hosted strings Words percent Hosted words Characters percent Hosted characters
Total 567 16,138 128,724
Translated 53% 301 49% 7,947 45% 58,786
Needs editing 35% 200 34% 5,591 38% 49,915
Read-only 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0
Failing checks 31% 177 37% 6,057 41% 53,666
Strings with suggestions 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0
Untranslated strings 11% 66 16% 2,600 15% 20,023
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Resource updated
The “fr-FR/14_security.po” file was changed. 2 days ago
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comparing the system to the last known uncompromised backup can quickly reveal the changes left by the attacker, e.g. files added, changed, or deleted;
 
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Once the “dynamic” elements have been saved, the next step is to store a complete image of the hard-disk. Making such an image is impossible if the filesystem is still evolving, which is why it must be remounted read-only. The simplest solution is often to halt the server brutally (after running <command>sync</command>) and reboot it on a rescue CD. Each partition should be copied with a tool such as <command>dd</command>; these images can be sent to another server (possibly with the very convenient <command>nc</command> tool). Another possibility may be even simpler: just get the disk out of the machine and replace it with a new one that can be reformatted and reinstalled. Most server providers offer a so-called rescue-console that essentially provides the same functionality as a rescue CD.
Une fois sauvegardés les éléments « dynamiques » les plus importants, il faut réaliser une image fidèle du disque complet. Il est impossible de réaliser une telle image si le système de fichiers évolue encore. Il faut donc le remonter en lecture seule <foreignphrase>(read-only)</foreignphrase>. Le plus simple est souvent de stopper le serveur (brutalement, après un <command>sync</command>) et de le démarrer sur un CD-Rom de secours. Une image de chaque partition peut alors être réalisée à l'aide du programme <command>dd</command>. Ces images peuvent être stockées sur un autre serveur (l'utilitaire <command>nc</command> est alors très pratique pour envoyer les données générées par <command>dd</command> d'une machine à une autre). Une autre solution, beaucoup plus simple, est de sortir le disque de la machine et de le remplacer par un neuf prêt à être réinstallé.
2 days ago
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Once the “dynamic” elements have been saved, the next step is to store a complete image of the hard-disk. Making such an image is impossible if the filesystem is still evolving, which is why it must be remounted read-only. The simplest solution is often to halt the server brutally (after running <command>sync</command>) and reboot it on a rescue CD. Each partition should be copied with a tool such as <command>dd</command>; these images can be sent to another server (possibly with the very convenient <command>nc</command> tool). Another possibility may be even simpler: just get the disk out of the machine and replace it with a new one that can be reformatted and reinstalled. Most server providers offer a so-called rescue-console that essentially provides the same functionality as a rescue CD.
2 days ago
User avatar None

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This may only be possible if the server is physically accessible. When the server is hosted in a hosting provider's data center halfway across the country, or if the server is not accessible for any other reason, it is usually a good idea to start by gathering some important information (see <xref linkend="sect.keeping-everything-that-could-be-used-as-evidence" />, <xref linkend="sect.forensic-analysis" /> and <xref linkend="sect.reconstituting-the-attack-scenario" />), then isolating that server as much as possible by shutting down as many services as possible (usually, everything but <command>sshd</command>). This case is still awkward, since one can't rule out the possibility of the attacker having SSH access like the administrator has; this makes it harder to “clean” the machines. If possible, and if the provider supports it, the server can be put offline and accessed through the providers KVM/IPMI interface or their rescue console. If the affected machine is a virtual machine, a snapshot should be taken immediately to secure evidence.
Ceci n'est possible que si l'on dispose d'un accès physique au serveur. Si ce n'est pas le cas (par exemple parce que le serveur est hébergé à l'autre bout du pays chez un prestataire d'hébergement), il peut être plus judicieux de commencer par récolter quelques informations importantes (voir <xref linkend="sect.keeping-everything-that-could-be-used-as-evidence" />, <xref linkend="sect.forensic-analysis" /> et <xref linkend="sect.reconstituting-the-attack-scenario" />), puis d'isoler autant que possible le serveur en stoppant le maximum de services (c'est-à-dire tout sauf <command>sshd</command>). Cette situation n'est pas recommandable car il est impossible de s'assurer que l'attaquant ne profite pas (comme l'administrateur) d'un accès via SSH. Il est difficile dans ces conditions de « nettoyer » la machine.
2 days ago
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Source string changed
This may only be possible if the server is physically accessible. When the server is hosted in a hosting provider's data center halfway across the country, or if the server is not accessible for any other reason, it' is usually a good idea to start by gathering some important information (see <xref linkend="sect.keeping-everything-that-could-be-used-as-evidence" />, <xref linkend="sect.forensic-analysis" /> and <xref linkend="sect.reconstituting-the-attack-scenario" />), then isolating that server as much as possible by shutting down as many services as possible (usually, everything but <command>sshd</command>). This case is still awkward, since one can't rule out the possibility of the attacker having SSH access like the administrator has; this makes it harder to “clean” the machines. If possible, and if the provider supports it, the server can be put offline and accessed through the providers KVM/IPMI interface or their rescue console. If the affected machine is a virtual machine, a snapshot should be taken immediately to secure evidence.
2 days ago
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a program that utilizes all CPU cores or memory;
 
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a command that suddenly shows errors like segmentation faults;
 
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Another very common scenario nowadays is a ransomware attack. The attackers will encrypt the data on the machine and leave a note with instructions how to pay ransom to get the key to decrypt the data. Of course, it is not for certain that even after paying, the data can be recovered or be sure it hasn't been stolen (and sold) as well.
 
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The consequences of an intrusion will have various levels of obviousness depending on the motivations of the attacker. “Script-kiddies“ only apply recipes they find on web sites; most often, they deface a web page or delete data. In more subtle cases, they add invisible contents to web pages so as to improve referrals to their own sites in search engines. In others, they simply install crypto-miners and use the compromised system to fill their crypto wallets.
Selon l'intention du pirate, son intrusion sera plus ou moins évidente. Les <foreignphrase>script-kiddies</foreignphrase> se contentent d'appliquer les recettes toutes prêtes qu'ils trouvent sur des sites web. Le vandalisme d'une page web ou la suppression des données sont les issues les plus probables. Parfois, c'est plus subtil et ils ajoutent du contenu invisible dans les pages web afin d'améliorer le référencement de certains de leurs sites.
2 days ago
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